Islamic Terrorism in the United States
Islamic Terrorism in the United States: A Strategic and Cultural Assessment
Islamic terrorism in the United States is not a new threat, nor is it a theoretical one. It is a documented pattern of ideologically motivated violence carried out by individuals or networks who adhere to a militant interpretation of Islam that demands hostility toward Western values, especially toward the United States. This threat intensified after the September 11 attacks, when nineteen jihadists turned commercial airliners into weapons and killed nearly three thousand Americans in a single morning. Since then, the United States has experienced a series of attacks and attempted attacks, ranging from the Fort Hood shooting, to the Boston Marathon bombing, to the San Bernardino mass murder, to the Pulse nightclub attack. Each case involved individuals radicalized by extremist Islamic teachings or propaganda, whether through foreign groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS or through local networks and online indoctrination.
The core issue behind these attacks is not ordinary religious practice, which millions of peaceful American Muslims engage in daily, but an ideology rooted in political Islam. This ideology demands global dominance, rejects the separation of religion and state, and views Western society as corrupt, decadent, and deserving of judgment. Radical Islamic groups exploit these beliefs to recruit, train, and inspire individuals who feel alienated, angry, or spiritually motivated to commit violence. The United States has provided a target-rich environment for such propaganda because of its open society, permissive communications networks, and cultural hesitancy to confront extremist ideology directly for fear of being called intolerant. This hesitation has allowed radical preachers, foreign influences, and online jihadist networks to operate more freely than they should.
Radicalization in the United States often follows predictable stages. Individuals begin by consuming extremist sermons or media that emphasize Islamic supremacy and martyrdom. They isolate themselves from Western culture, adopt increasingly militant rhetoric, and seek out like-minded individuals. Eventually, they cross the psychological threshold toward violence, believing that killing civilians or attacking public spaces is an act of worship. These lone-actor jihadists are the most difficult for authorities to identify because they do not require formal training or direct contact with foreign terrorist organizations. A knife, rifle, vehicle, or homemade explosive becomes their tool of choice, and the target is any gathering of unprotected civilians.
Law enforcement has prevented dozens of plots by monitoring online spaces, human networks, and suspicious behavior, yet the threat persists because the ideology itself continues to spread. Political leaders often avoid acknowledging the theological motivations behind these attacks, preferring to label them as generic “violent extremism.” This refusal to identify the ideology empowers radicals, because ideological movements cannot be defeated when the ideology is treated as off-limits. Conservatives have long argued that the United States cannot effectively combat Islamist terrorism without speaking plainly about what drives it. The belief in establishing an Islamic state, rejecting Western law, and achieving glory through jihad are not random factors, they are the reasons behind these attacks.
The long-term security challenge is balancing civil liberty with vigilance. The United States must continue to distinguish between peaceful Muslim citizens who live normal lives and individuals who embrace radical political Islam. At the same time, there is no benefit to pretending that radical Islamic terrorism does not exist or that it is morally equivalent to other types of violence. The data shows a clear theme: when Islamic extremism takes root, violence follows. Preventing future attacks requires aggressive intelligence work, strong borders, responsible immigration vetting, and a justice system that is not afraid to prosecute ideological crimes. Public awareness is also essential, because early indicators of radicalization are often visible to family, friends, and co-workers before they are visible to federal authorities.
Muslim terrorism in the United States is not an overwhelming presence, but it is a stubborn and evolving threat that cannot be ignored. The American people, especially those who value law, order, and national identity, must remain watchful and realistic about the dangers posed by militant Islamic ideology. The nation remains safest when it tells the truth, confronts extremism without hesitation, and refuses to allow political correctness to blind it to genuine threats.
Notable Recent Examples
2025 New Orleans truck attack
On January 1, 2025, a U.S. citizen named Shamsud-Din Bahar Jabbar drove a pickup truck into a crowded street on Bourbon Street in New Orleans, then exited the vehicle and opened fire. He reportedly displayed a flag associated with Islamic State (ISIS) and authorities found weapons and suspected explosive devices. Fifteen people died (including the attacker) and dozens were injured. The FBI classified the incident as an act of Islamic terrorism. Wikipedia+2Reuters+2
This attack stands out not only for the high casualty count but also for the fact that the perpetrator was a U.S. citizen with prior military service — showing that radicalization and lethal intent can emerge even among those with prior service and civilian lives.
2025 Detroit area ISIS-inspired Halloween plot (October 2025)
In late October 2025 federal authorities in Michigan arrested two young men who allegedly had acquired high-powered weapons and had scouted LGBTQ+ bars for possible attacks timed around Halloween. The suspects — identified as Mohmed Ali and Majed Mahmoud — were accused of being inspired by ISIS ideology and conspiring to commit violent acts. One co-conspirator’s phone contained evidence of extremist messaging, photos in military-style garb, and planning communications about traveling to join ISIS abroad. San Francisco Chronicle+2Yahoo+2
The case underscores how even small cells or individuals influenced by jihadist ideology remain active within the U.S., targeting civilian populations and intending to carry out terror attacks on U.S. soil.
2024 Election Day terror plot (Foiled)
In October 2024 authorities arrested Nasir Ahmad Tawhedi, a 27-year-old Afghan national, for plotting a terrorist attack on Election Day in the United States. According to the complaint, Tawhedi attempted to provide material support to ISIS by procuring AK-47 rifles and ammunition, liquidating family assets, and preparing logistics. The intent appeared to be a violent, likely mass-casualty event in the name of ISIS. Department of Justice+1
This plot — despite being prevented — illustrates the persistent risk of attempts tied to international jihadist ideology, even when the individual is resident in the U.S. and operating without a large organizational backing.
Mohammed Chhipa — 2024 Conviction for Funding ISIS
In 2024 a man from Springfield, Virginia was convicted on multiple terrorism-related charges for funneling money to ISIS. According to court records, Chhipa met covertly with an undercover FBI agent, accepted funds, converted them to cryptocurrency (bitcoin), and transferred over $74,000 through foreign channels to assistance for ISIS affiliates overseas. Prosecutors described this as “material support” to a foreign terrorist organization. AP News+1
While not a violent attack inside the U.S., this case demonstrates how financial support networks — even domestic ones — remain a key vulnerability that enables global jihadist organizations to persist.
What Analysts Say About Trends
According to recent analysis by CSIS, between January 1, 2020 and January 1, 2025 the U.S. saw 8 jihadist attacks and 10 disrupted plots — roughly averaging 3 attacks or plots per year. CSIS+1
Since the territorial defeat of ISIS in 2019, the lethality of jihadist attacks on U.S. soil has declined in aggregate. CSIS+1
At the same time, domestic and foreign extremist threats remain “persistent and deadly,” especially through lone-actors and small networks rather than large scale coordinated assaults. Department of Homeland Security+2Domestic Preparedness+2
Why This Matters — and What It Shows
These recent examples confirm several hard truths:
Radicalization can occur inside the U.S., among legal residents or citizens — not only through foreign infiltration.
Even “lone wolf” attackers or small conspiracies inspired by jihadist ideology can kill or wound many innocent civilians.
Terrorist plots may take many forms: vehicle-ramming, shootings, explosives, or financial support for overseas terror groups.
Disrupted plots — like the 2024 Election Day case — show vulnerabilities not only in physical security but in vetting, law enforcement attention, and financial flows.
The decline in attack frequency or lethality does not mean the threat is gone — jihadist ideology remains active, evolving, and capable of producing new killers or financiers at any time.
The 2021 Afghanistan Withdrawal and OAW Resettlement
When the U.S. military withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021, the Administration rushed to evacuate and resettle tens of thousands of Afghan nationals, many of whom had worked with U.S. forces or allied institutions in Afghanistan. Wikipedia+2Tennessee Star+2
The civilian-led resettlement process was instituted under Operation Allies Welcome (OAW), managed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), with support from multiple agencies including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and others. Chuck Grassley+2ALM+2
Because this effort happened in the chaos of the Taliban takeover — under pressure to evacuate and relocate thousands quickly — security screening and vetting procedures faced extraordinary strain. Multiple oversight reports have since concluded that the vetting process was substantially flawed. Tennessee Star+2Chuck Grassley+2
Findings of Vetting Failures and Oversight Warnings
A report from DHS’s own Office of Inspector General (OIG) concluded that screening and vetting of Afghan evacuees under OAW “had a fragmented process.” Many evacuees were paroled into the United States even though they had not been vetted against the Department of Defense (DOD)’s tactical databases, which track individuals with potential security or terror-related risks. Chuck Grassley+1
Records indicate data issues across immigration processing: incomplete or missing personal information, incorrect alien numbers, and insufficient tracking of parole expirations. These administrative failures made tracking and evaluating security risks over time difficult or impossible. Chuck Grassley+1
Some evacuees were flagged by the FBI’s screening systems after arrival — at least 55 Afghan evacuees were matched with the terrorist-watch database at some point. Chuck Grassley+1
A portion of those flagged were allowed to remain in the United States despite “derogatory information.” As of July 2024, several remained under watch, and some were under active investigation. Chuck Grassley+1
Moreover, as recently as late 2025, a congressional oversight effort led by Chuck Grassley reiterated that the failure to properly vet Afghan evacuees posed a serious threat to national security. The investigation criticized both DHS and the FBI for failing to track or remediate security-risk individuals admitted under OAW. Senate Judiciary Committee+1
Recent Incidents Illustrating the Fallout
Shooting of National Guard Members Near Washington, D.C. (2025)
In late November 2025, an Afghan national, Rahmanullah Lakanwal, allegedly shot and killed a member of the National Guard and critically wounded another near Washington, D.C. Lakanwal had entered the U.S. on September 8, 2021, under OAW. Wikipedia+2Tennessee Star+2
Although Lakanwal reportedly had worked in an elite paramilitary unit in Afghanistan, some defenders of the vetting process claim he passed counterterrorism screening before being admitted. Newsweek+1
Regardless, the shooting underscores the risks inherent in admitting large numbers of evacuees under rushed or flawed vetting procedures. It ignited widespread bipartisan concern and re-examined the adequacy of the 2021 resettlement process. Newsweek+2Tennessee Star+2
Arrest of Afghan Evacuee for Alleged Terror Plot (2024–2025)
Another Afghan evacuee, Nasir Ahmad Tawhedi, was arrested in 2024–2025 for allegedly plotting a domestic terror attack on Election Day on behalf of the militant group ISIS.
Tawhedi’s case became central to congressional scrutiny. The fact that a person admitted under the evacuation and resettlement program was capable of planning such an attack led watchdogs and lawmakers to argue that the Administration had granted protection to individuals with terror-linked backgrounds.
Structural and Policy Implications of the Screening Failures
The failures surrounding OAW’s screening process reflect deeper structural problems. The vetting process was overwhelmed, under-resourced, and lacked adequate coordination between DHS, the FBI, DOD, State Department, and other agencies.
Because many evacuees were paroled temporarily rather than granted permanent status immediately, tracking their movements, status changes, or parole expirations became difficult. The system lacked follow-up mechanisms to ensure continued compliance or flag post-arrival threats.
Additionally, when individuals were flagged by screening after entry, immigration agencies rarely took decisive steps such as removal or parole termination. Bureaucratic inertia, overlapping responsibilities, and unclear agency accountability contributed to prolonged exposure to risk.
Conclusion: The Biden Administration’s Resettlement Policy Created Real Risks
The 2021 evacuation from Afghanistan and subsequent resettlement under OAW was a humanitarian project but was carried out under extraordinary time pressure and organizational chaos. The result was a large-scale admission of Afghan nationals into the United States with a vetting framework that watchdogs now regard as seriously deficient.
Cases like the 2025 National Guard shooting and the 2024–2025 terror-plot arrest illustrate that some of the individuals admitted under that program posed real security risks — risks that may have been detectable or preventable with more rigorous, coordinated vetting and follow-up.
The failures were systemic, not isolated. The lack of proper vetting, data-tracking, post-arrival monitoring, and failure to act on derogatory information represent institutional breakdowns. The consequences to American security remain real and ongoing.
Obama’s Refugee-Resettlement Policy: A Broad Welcome
Under Obama, the United States undertook one of the largest peacetime refugee-resettlement efforts in its history. In fiscal year 2016 alone, the U.S. admitted 84,995 refugees — effectively meeting the ceiling the administration had set.
Part of that refugee flow came from conflict zones with large Muslim populations. For instance, the administration set a goal to admit 10,000 Syrian refugees in fiscal 2016. The United States ended up admitting 12,587 Syrian refugees that fiscal year.
Analysis by immigration-policy researchers indicates that during the first three years of Obama’s first term, Muslims made up about 23 percent of all refugees admitted; during the second term, that share rose to around 40 percent.
Additionally, among African refugee populations resettled under Obama were refugees from countries such as Somalia. Reports estimate that roughly 43,000 Somali refugees were resettled in the U.S. over the eight-year span of his presidency.
In short, Obama’s refugee policy was characterized by generous refugee-ceilings, large-scale resettlement, and inclusion of many from Muslim-majority countries.
The Obama years saw a big influx of Somali refugees into the United States, and a disproportionate share of jihadist recruitment later showed up in and around Ilhan Omar’s district in Minneapolis. That is not conspiracy talk, it is documented in multiple federal and media sources, even if the political establishment does not like to say it plainly.
During Barack Obama’s two terms, roughly fifty-four thousand Somali refugees were resettled in the United States in total. They did not all go to Minnesota, but Minnesota has, over decades, become the main hub of the Somali diaspora in America, with around eighty-seven thousand Somali residents as of recent counts, most of them in the Minneapolis–St Paul area. The arrivals under Obama built on a stream that started back in the early 1990s, but his administration’s high refugee ceilings and willingness to take people from failed states like Somalia unquestionably grew the size and concentration of that community.
Resettling large numbers of people from a failed Islamic state into a small number of American metro areas created the same problem you see in Europe, namely, tightly packed ethnic enclaves with weak assimilation, high welfare use, and pressure from imported clan politics and religious leaders. Most Somali immigrants are not terrorists, but you do not need most of them to be extremists for a national-security problem to exist. A small pool of alienated young men, steeped in grievance and exposed to jihadist propaganda, is more than enough. Federal and local authorities have been saying for more than a decade that Minneapolis in particular became a recruiting ground for Islamic extremists. CBS News reported back in 2014 that as many as forty young men from Minneapolis had gone overseas to fight with jihadist groups after being pulled in by recruiters and social-media propaganda. A Department of Homeland Security fact sheet noted that beginning around 2007 more than twenty Somali-Americans from Minnesota left to fight for al-Shabaab in Somalia. The pattern was clear long before anyone had heard of Ilhan Omar.
What changed with Omar’s rise is that the congressional district containing this recruiting hot spot suddenly had a national political figure who was Somali, Muslim, and ideologically on the far left. By 2019, Christian and conservative outlets were calling Minnesota’s Fifth Congressional District, now represented by Ilhan Omar, the “terrorist recruitment capital” of the United States, citing FBI statistics on the number of foreign-fighter and ISIS-related cases originating there. That phrasing is blunt, but it reflects a real concentration of cases: over and over, federal prosecutions and investigations into ISIS and al-Shabaab recruits have pointed back to Minneapolis’ Somali community as the origin.
Ilhan Omar’s own record has not helped. She did not personally create the problem of jihadist recruitment, but she has consistently framed aggressive law-enforcement and sentencing as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. When six young Somali-American men from Minnesota were arrested in 2015 for trying to travel to Syria and join ISIS, she wrote a letter to the judge calling for “compassion” and lighter sentences, warning that punitive measures “inevitably create an environment in which extremism can flourish” and arguing for inclusion and rehabilitation. That is exactly backward from a deterrence standpoint. In a community already known for sending fighters to al-Shabaab and ISIS, signaling that even would-be foreign fighters should be treated gently sends the message that the political leadership is more worried about offenders’ feelings than about protecting the country.
From a policy standpoint, the story looks like this. First, the United States, under both Republican and Democratic administrations but especially under Obama’s higher ceilings, brought in tens of thousands of Somali refugees from one of the most unstable, jihad-infested countries on earth. Second, instead of dispersing them broadly, large numbers were clustered into one metro area around Minneapolis.Third, local and federal authorities either underestimated or soft-pedaled the ideological risk and allowed radical preachers and online networks to groom a slice of the youth. The result was that Minnesota, and particularly the area now represented by Ilhan Omar, produced more foreign fighters and ISIS-linked cases than any other part of the country, enough for federal officials and media to describe it openly as a recruiting ground for jihad.
A sober assessment has to hold two things together at once. On one hand, most Somali refugees and their children are not involved in terrorism, and it would be dishonest to paint the entire group as terrorists. On the other hand, the combination of Obama-era resettlement policy, high-density enclaves, weak assimilation, and permissive, progressive leadership in places like Minneapolis has produced a measurable, documented concentration of jihadist recruitment and material-support cases in and around Ilhan Omar’s district. That is not racism, it is pattern recognition. Ignoring it for the sake of political correctness only guarantees that the problem festers.
In short, Obama-era Somali resettlement created a large, politically sensitive community in Minnesota, and the Minneapolis area, including Ilhan Omar’s district, has generated an outsized share of ISIS and al-Shabaab recruitment compared to the rest of the country. That reality should inform future refugee policy, vetting standards, and integration strategy, no matter how loudly the left tries to shout “Islamophobia” whenever anyone points it out.
